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‘Inspirations of which we are not capable of judging’: 
Coleridge’s View of the Daimonion of Socrates and its 





OTHING IN SOCRATES has been more perplexing to posterity than his 
daimonion.’ 2 
 
When he came to discuss Socrates in his 1819 Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
Coleridge could not avoid commenting on what had throughout the eighteenth 
century been one of the most controversial legends surrounding the ancient 
philosopher: Socrates’s ‘daimonion’, or divine sign. In Coleridge’s seemingly 
hesitant words: ‘I should be thought to have omitted a very important or at 
least interesting part of the disquisition if I did not say a few words on the 
daemon of Socrates’ (LHP I 143). The phenomenon is attested by both Plato 
and Xenephon, the two writers who provided the most detailed and 
sympathetic eyewitness accounts of Socrates’s life and teachings.   The clearest 
account attributed directly to Socrates appears in the Apology, where he explains 
that ‘I am subject to a divine or supernatural experience [daimonion], which 
Meletus saw fit to travesty in his indictment.  It began in my early childhood – 
a sort of voice which comes to me, and when it comes it always dissuades me 
from what I am proposing to do, and never urges me on.’3 As this quotation 
indicates, the daimonion was controversial from the beginning: one of the 
charges against Socrates at the trial in which he was condemned to death was 
that he invented new gods.4  In the same speech, Socrates gives an example of 
the negative injunctions he received from the daimonion: it forbad him from 
entering public life as a politician. In the Phaedrus, the daimonic sign intervenes 
at a dramatic moment, apparently rebuking Socrates for the unworthy speech 
he has begun about the divinity eros. The daimonion is a form of divine 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1  This article is based on a paper given at the seminar ‘Diffractions: Researching into Sources, Influences, Interactions 
in Literature and Philosophy’ at the Italian Department, University of Warwick, 11 March 2014. I am grateful to the 
participants, especially Graham Davidson, Martina Piperno (the organiser), and Fabio Camilletti (the chair), for 
helpful discussion. 
2  Gregory Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy, vol. 2: Socrates, Plato and their Tradition, ed. Daniel W. Graham (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 29. 
3  Apology 31c-d (tr. Hugh Tredennick). Translations from Plato are taken from The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the 
Letters, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Bollingen, 1961), and referenced using the 
standard Stephanus pagination. In Xenephon’s account, the daimonion works the other way round, giving positive 
advice and urging Socrates to act in particular ways. Michael J.B. Allen provides a complete list of the relevant 
passages: Plato, Euthydemus 273a; I Alcibiades 103a, 105e, 124c; Euthyphro 3b; Apology 31c, 40a; Republic VI, 496c; 
Theatetus 151a; Phaedrus 242c; Theages 128d (now considered inauthentic). Xenephon, Apology 12; Memorabilia IV, 8, 1. 
Michael J.B. Allen, Synoptic Art: Marsilio Ficino on the History of Platonic Interpretation (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1998),  
130. The  daimonion remained topical in later Platonism: Plutarch, Apuleius, Maximus and Proclus all wrote 
treatises on it. 
4  Diogenes Laertius reports the charge (the original of which has not survived): ‘This indictment and affidavit is sworn 
by Meletus, the son of Meletus of Pitthos, against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus of Alopece: Socrates is guilty of 
refusing to recognize the gods recognized by the state, and of introducing other new divinities. He is also guilty of 
corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death.’ ‘Socrates’, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R.D. Hicks 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972; first published 1925), l.171 
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possession, but, crucially, a more rational one than the frenzy that Socrates 
disapprovingly attributes to the poets in dialogues such as Ion and Republic.5 
Although Plato seems to have used the term ‘daimonion’ (as opposed to the 
more usual ‘daemon’) in order to indicate its uniqueness to Socrates, 
subsequent writers tended to assimilate it to a more general daemonology;6 so 
that, as Angus Nicholls puts it, ‘[t]he daimonion appears to be a singular 
instance or effect of the general sensibility or conduit of the daemonic, a 
sensibility that mediates between the secular and the divine.’7  
 One might expect Coleridge’s interpretation of the daimonion of Socrates 
to be interesting for various reasons. His early poems, ‘Kubla Khan’ and ‘The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, play with the notion of daemons, presences 
between the divine and the human, of which the ‘demon lover’ in the former 
poem and the ‘Polar Spirit’ in the latter are two memorable examples. Indeed, 
Coleridge agreed during his initial collaboration with Wordsworth on the 
Lyrical Ballads that he would write ‘supernatural’ poems, which would evoke an 
atmosphere of daemonic agency. He had been stimulated to this project in part 
by reading the Platonic translations of Thomas Taylor, in which he would have 
discovered material about the daimonion of Socrates.8 Further, in his prose, 
Coleridge regularly uses silence-formulae reminiscent of the abrupt pauses of 
Socrates. Breaking off a discussion of the nature of the Day of Judgment in 
Biographia Literaria, for example, Coleridge states that he is ‘warned from within 
and from without, that it is profanation to speak of these mysteries’ (BL I 114). 
Here, the equivocation of ‘within and… without’ bears comparison with the 
private, yet apparently external voice that Socrates heard. More loosely, another 
reason why Coleridge would be likely to take an interest in the daimonion of 
Socrates lies in the fact that one tradition linked it to the notion of genius, as 
emphasised in the title of Plutarch’s dialogue, De genio Socratis. Given that 
Coleridge took care to present himself as a philosopher of genius, this is one of 
the possible sources for the sense of affinity with Socrates that he displays in 
the Lectures on the History of Philosophy.9 Fashioning himself as a poet-critic, a 
writer whose creativity was balanced by a ‘notion of his notions’ (BL I 251), 
Coleridge (for instance) published a preface to ‘Kubla Khan’ that has the effect 
of truncating the verse by explaining in psychological terms why it was 
impossible to complete it. The notorious ‘person on business from Porlock’ is 
daemonic to the extent that (s)he is neither clearly part of the poet’s persona 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
5  On this matter in relation to Coleridge, see James Vigus, Platonic Coleridge (Oxford: Legenda, 2009), 63-92. 
6  Mark Joyal, The Platonic Theages: An Introduction, Commentary and Critical Edition (Stuttgart: Frank Steiner, 2000), 70-71, 
102. 
7  Angus Nicholls, Goethe’s Concept of the Daemonic: After the Ancients (Rochester, New York: Boydell and Brewer, 2006), 
57. Plato, Symposium 202e focuses on the daemons’ role as intermediaries. 
8  On Coleridge’s reading and critique of Taylor, see Vigus, Platonic Coleridge, 26-30. 
9  For a stimulating account of the strategies by which Coleridge attributed genius to himself as a philosopher, see 
Monika Class, Coleridge and Kantian Ideas in England, 1796-1817 (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 151-68. David Ferris 
compares the story of Timarchus’s experience in an oracular crypt (where he was attempting to discover the secret 
of Socrates’s daimonion), as told by Plutarch, with the fictitious ‘letter from a friend’ that Coleridge inserts to break 
off Biographia Literaria chapter 13 – the ‘friend’ has a gothic experience of ‘palpable darkness’, and so on (BL I 301). 
David Ferris, ‘Coleridge’s Ventriloquy: The Abduction from the Biographia’, Studies in Romanticism 24: 1 (Spring 1985), 
41-84 (83, note 64). 
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nor fully distinct from it.10 In these comparative respects, the daimonion of 
Socrates would seem to be a Coleridgean presence. 
 In fact, as his dutiful approach in the lecture might already indicate (‘I 
should be thought…’), Coleridge’s direct comments on the daimonion are 
relatively few, and limited in scope. In my view, however, they propel the 
providential narrative of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Further, in the 
context of the longstanding controversy on the daimonion, Coleridge’s 
remarks reveal the extent to which his religious concerns in 1819 retained 
continuity with his youthful period as a Unitarian radical in the 1790s. As I will 
show, the direction of Coleridge’s interpretation in 1819 onwards is consonant 
with his rejection of Unitarian (or Socinian) theology and culture, which had 
become emphatic by the time he delivered the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy. There is, however, a twist in this apparently straightforward tale: 
Coleridge’s view of the Socratic daimonion bears more resemblance to that of 
Joseph Priestley, the foremost Unitarian theologian of the 1790s, than to those 
of any of the other participants in the longstanding debate on this topic.  
 My focus on what might seem on first reading a minor detail – a particular 
section of the third of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, and one in which 
Coleridge speaks with a somewhat uncertain voice – requires a methodological 
justification. The Lectures remain under-read, even in J. R. de J. Jackson’s 
splendid edition published in 2000, in part because of the taint of unoriginality 
– and plagiarism – that continues to be associated with Coleridge’s 
philosophical thought. The arraignment of Coleridge reached its apotheosis in 
Norman Fruman’s substantial but sensational book Coleridge: The Damaged 
Archangel. In Fruman’s view, the drug-afflicted disorder of Coleridge’s personal 
life resulted in a kind of literary kleptomania; and Fruman responded to 
passages in Coleridge’s prose such as the above-quoted silence formula 
(‘warned from within and from without’) with irritated impatience.11 Fruman’s 
zest for the prosecution led him to even label as plagiarised passages from 
other authors in lecture notes which Coleridge did not prepare for 
publication.12 At the other extreme, Thomas McFarland, while agreeing that 
Coleridge’s compositional habits were ‘neurotic’, presented a value judgment 
the reverse of Fruman’s: McFarland claimed that Coleridge wrote in ‘mosaic’ 
style, constantly piecing together fragments from other writers. McFarland 
regarded this method not as culpable but rather as a heroic endeavour at 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
10  Gregory Leadbetter, Coleridge and the Daemonic Imagination (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
argues that the mystery poems dramatise ‘self-realization in daemonic form’ (185). Leadbetter describes how 
Coleridgean psychology ‘combines activity and passivity, in the willing exposure of the self to forces greater than it 
could control’ (167). Graham Davidson has pointed out to me that Coleridge also ‘daemonizes’ poetic presences 
such as Sara Hutchinson and Charles Lamb. 
11  ‘The reader who has been laboring after Coleridge may well feel both cheated and insulted by this declaration.’ 
Norman Fruman, Coleridge: The Damaged Archangel (London: George Braziller, 1970), 79. 
12  See the chapter on ‘The Philosophical Lectures’, Fruman, pp. 108-120. Andrew Keanie, who has appraised Fruman’s 
work very judiciously (‘Coleridge, the Damaged Archangel’, Essays in Criticism 56: 1 (2005), 72-93, nevertheless 
echoes this approach in another essay in which he declares that ‘Spoken plagiarism is more difficult to detect than 
written plagiarism’: Andrew Keanie, ‘Coleridge and Plagiarism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. 
by Frederick Burwick (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 435-454 (436). 
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systematicity.13 Yet most of Coleridge’s prose does not readily fit either the 
Fruman-model or the McFarland-model. The passages on the daimonion of 
Socrates are in this sense a typical case in point, in that they invite excavation 
without being an instance either of plagiarism or of sublime synthesis. An 
approach to this topic should, then, involve moving beyond the old models. 
Rather than think in terms of plagiarism or ‘reticulation’ (McFarland’s 
evocative word), it is necessary to reconstruct a complex intellectual setting in 
which writers established and rejected allegiances through various levels of 
quotation and allusion. 
 In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy Socrates and Plato feature as leading 
figures in the struggle against sophistry, which Coleridge by this time identifies 
with the materialism and scepticism he considered characteristic of eighteenth-
century thought. In Lectures three to five Coleridge offers a very sympathetic 
view of Socrates, though he is constrained by his Christian agenda to rank 
Socrates below the level of perfection; he accordingly criticises Socrates for 
indulging in a kind of reasoning that outmanoeuvres opponents yet without 
producing inner certainty:   
 
At all events, by his example he gave currency to a mode of argument 
which may be as easily, perhaps more easily, adapted to delusion than 
sound conviction. It has the misfortune at least, by entangling a man in a 
number of questions the answers to which he does not anticipate, of 
leaving a final conviction as if the man were cheated in the conclusion 
though he could see no mode afterwards to escape from it. (LHP I 142) 
 
This passage, with its suggestion of ‘cheating’ in Socratic argument, reveals 
Coleridge’s radical lack of sympathy with Socratic irony. Coleridge proceeds to 
argue, however, that Socrates’s unique value lies neither in the rigour nor the 
drawbacks of his philosophical procedure. Rather it is his religious sense that 
renders him a pivotal figure in the history of moral thought. Socrates had 
 
… a deep, nay what our enlightened men of the present day would 
perhaps call a superstitious and earnest piety which disposed him to the 
reverence of the unknown whatever it were, nay even to a reverence of 
the best signs of it (however he might disapprove of them) which 
secured his fellow creatures from being merely as the beasts that perish. 
He was in every sense of the word a religious man… (LHP I 142-3) 
 
This emphasis on mystery, on the ‘unknown’ as the object of Socrates’s piety, 
provides a vital basis for Coleridge’s discussion of the ancient philosopher. It is 
in this context that Coleridge comments on the daimonion of Socrates – or 
daemon, as Coleridge calls it, reflecting its Neoplatonic assimilation to more 
general speculations concerning the spiritual world. Coleridge offers several 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
13 Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); McFarland, 
‘Coleridge’s Plagiarisms Once More’, Yale Review 62 (1974), 252-86. 
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thoughts, some of which may be traced to a precise source, but others not. 
First: 
 
[Socrates] thought himself, and he asserted himself to be, accompanied 
by a daemon as he called it; it gave him no light, no insight; it was as 
evidently not [conscience], for it never decided on the right or wrong of 
any action, but it was a [preventive warning or] presentiment which, 
whenever he was about to do that which would be injurious either 
temporally or morally, withheld him. (LHP I 143) 
 
Coleridge gleans this first point from his principal source for the whole lecture 
series, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann’s history of philosophy. Tennemann 
quotes the dialogue Theages, which is of unknown authorship, but was in the 
early nineteenth century still considered to be a work of Plato.14 Tennemann, as 
a follower of Kant, takes up from Theages the conviction that the daimonion 
cannot be conscience. This is evident in the dialogue from the fact that 
Socrates relates instances in which it occurs merely to prevent him and his 
companions from acting in a way that would be contrary to their own best 
interests.15 For Tennemann, the Kantian, it was important to underline this 
point given that moral conduct stems from the human will, and the Socratic 
daimonion appears to operate independently from the will. Coleridge, in 
sympathy with Tennemann’s Kantianism even as he felt exasperated by its 
more inflexible manifestations, clearly agrees. 
 Second, Coleridge emphasises the effect that the daimonion had on others 
around Socrates, and the fact that Socrates was apparently unable to offer an 
explanation for this effect. He cites a story that witnessing this phenomenon 
convinced a hardened sceptic that ‘there was something divine’ (LHP I 144). 
The source for this is unclear, but is may be a passage of Theages,16 according to 
which Aristides found his philosophical ability increase as long as he remained 
with Socrates, but it drained away thereafter – this after a series of stories in 
which failure to heed the daimonion’s warnings led to disaster. That Coleridge 
adds the ‘something divine’ indicates the direction of his own narrative.  
 Third, the most important point for Coleridge is that the daimonion is 
mysterious and as impossible for him to explain as he believes it was for 
Socrates. He repeatedly avers (without clear textual authority) that Socrates 
declared it inexplicable; and he argues further that Socrates’s character did not 
dispose him to the self-deception of which, say, Gibbon accuses him.17 In the 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
14  Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 11 vols (Leipzig: 1798-1819), II, 32f. Modern scholars 
generally concur with Schleiermacher’s view that Plato was not the author of Theages. 
15  Joyal, Platonic Theages, 66, 72. For the text, see Jacques Bailly (ed.), The Socratic Theages: Introduction, English Translation, 
Greek Text and Commentary (Zurich and New York, 2003), 73-86. 
16  Theages 130d-e (cf. LHP I 144 note 91). 
17 A space in the manuscript here suggests that Coleridge might have quoted a passage from Gibbon, and Jackson 
(LHP I 144 note 92) suggests the following: ‘From enthusiasm to imposture, the step is perilous and slippery; the 
demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance, how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may 
deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary 
fraud’. Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 12 vols (London, 1818), IX, 321-2. 
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next paragraph of the lecture report, Coleridge invokes a religious context, 
suggesting that the example of Socrates shows how the Providence that guided 
the Israelites also influenced the Greeks: 
 
I say I cannot pretend to limit the powers of Providence; I can on the 
contrary see very substantial motives for the supposition that while God 
acted directly upon the chosen nation, as preparing a receptacle for that 
religion which was to spread over all mankind, He did not in the 
meantime wholly abandon those who were hereafter to be taken into his 
church; but in other ways, so distinguishable from the truths of 
revelation and the miracles that accompanied it as not to hazard the least 
confusion, and yet a sufficient pledge that his Providence was universal 
and that wherever there was a heart that truly loved him, there His 
assistance was given, either by the means of nature or by inspirations of 
which we are not capable of judging. (LHP I 144-5)  
 
It might be argued that in this new paragraph Coleridge has moved on from 
the topic of the daimonion to make an entirely general assertion. But in my 
view it is most likely that he considers the daimonion to be foremost among 
these ‘inspirations’. The evidence is partly textual, and partly contextual. First, 
in Coleridge’s own notes for the lecture, he writes that ‘it was not according to 
his own account Inspiration – nor was it Conscience’ (LHP I 158). The 
assertion here that it was not conscience is plain, whereas it is only according 
to the ‘account’ of Socrates (who did not have Christian concepts available to 
him) that it was ‘not inspiration’. This passage is thus consistent with the 
notion of ‘inspirations of which we are not capable of judging.’ The daimonion 
is the outstanding example of this super-natural element in Socrates’s 
‘anticipation of some clearer knowledge which doubtless prepared greatly for 
the reception of Christianity’ (LHP I 146): for it is the daimonion’s ‘influence 
on those around [Socrates]’ that Coleridge has been at pains to emphasise 
(LHP I 143). Immediately after the mention of ‘inspirations of which we are 
not capable of judging’, Coleridge mentions Socrates’s ‘martyrdom’ upon 
charges that included that of inventing new gods, so the daimonion remains in 
his mind at this point. 
 Second, and contrary to J. R. de J. Jackson’s view that Coleridge’s ‘stress on 
Socrates’s piety and on his “daemon” is […] unusual’ (LHP I lxxxix), Coleridge 
knows that that the status of the daimonion had been crucial for Christian 
interpretations of Socrates at least since the Renaissance. The connection 
between the daimonion and the possibility of asserting that a salvific 
providence always operated in some way, even before Christ, appears clearly in 
Joseph Priestley’s book Socrates and Jesus Compared. Priestley, comparing the two 
lives point-for-point, argues in a notably similar way to Coleridge. He first 
defends Socrates’s integrity of character, then invokes his steadfastness at his 
trial. Next, just like Coleridge, Priestley refers to the mysteriousness of the 
daimonion (‘a question of great obscurity’); and concludes in rather hesitant 
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terms that it probably was a manifestation of providence: 
 
In no other respect does Socrates appear to have been an enthusiast. On 
the contrary, he was a man of a calm and even temper, not distinguished 
by any peculiarity of behaviour, or extravagance of any kind. […] Since, 
then, he persisted in his account of these admonitions to the last, and in 
the most serious situation that a man could be in, and his veracity was 
never questioned, though I am far from forming any fixed opinion on 
any subject of so great obscurity, I think it may admit of a doubt, 
whether they may not be supposed to have come, in whatever manner 
they were given, from God. […] That in any manner whatever, and in 
what degree soever, it shall appear that the maker of the world gives 
attention to it, it is a proof of the reality of a providence in general, and 
of the divine interference out of the usual course of the laws of nature. 
[…] Thus do such supernatural suggestions as Socrates asserts that he 
had afford some obscure and indistinct evidence of a moral government 
of the world, and consequently of a future state of righteous 
retribution.18 
 
The similarity between the line of argument and the summation of Coleridge 
and Priestley is striking, and it helps to indicate how central the daimonion was 
to Coleridge’s interpretation of Socrates. It is not unlikely that Coleridge would 
have read Priestley’s work, but I know of no record of his having done so; and 
there is no evidence that it was among his immediate sources for the lectures 
on Socrates and Plato. In other words, the similarity between Coleridge and 
Priestley is a ‘genial coincidence’ (to borrow Coleridge’s phrase, BL I 160) 
rather than an instance of either plagiarism or sublime synthesis. It is an 
apparently surprising one, given that by 1819 Coleridge had firmly rejected the 
Unitarian theology of Priestley of which he had been a partisan in the mid-
1790s. By tracing relevant portions of the eighteenth-century controversy 
about the daimonion, however, we can begin to see why the opinions of 
Priestley and Coleridge coincided. 
 The hint is there at the end of the above quotation from Priestley. 
‘Supernatural suggestions’ in ancient times, such as that of the daimonion, tend 
to disclose ‘a moral government of the world’ – and ‘consequently’ the 
presence of heaven and hell: Christ was thus not the first who knew and 
revealed this. Although Priestley, always a faster and looser thinker than 
Coleridge, draws this equation in a cavalier fashion, he does identify the crucial 
point of the debate. It is a version of the medieval problem of the virtuous 
pagan (did God really damn to hell everyone who lived before Christ and so 
could not turn to him – even Socrates?), reconstituted for the Enlightenment. 
The question now runs like this: is it really possible that God left the ancient 
world in moral darkness prior to the coming of Christ? If Socrates’s mysterious 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
18  Joseph Priestley, Socrates and Jesus Compared (London: J. Johnson, 1803), pp. 29-31, italics added. 
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daimonion was not purely delusional, then it may constitute evidence that 
providence was already lending a guiding hand. Yet this reasoning is double-
edged, in view of the uniqueness of the revelation that Christianity claims. If 
Socrates’s daimonion is genuinely divine, then we will find it difficult to 
distinguish it in kind from the supernatural events related by the gospels.  
 Coleridge’s (and Priestley’s) syncretistic solution to this dilemma echoes that 
of the Christian Neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino. According to this view, if 
Socrates is allowed a certain limited level of divine illumination, then he can be 
understood as a forerunner to Christ and so an early instrument of providence. 
This claim was central to Ficino’s interpretation: ‘Socrates, though not a type 
(figura) like Job or John the Baptist, was yet perhaps a foreshadowing of Christ, 
the author of our salvation: he served as a preparatory signal, so to speak.’19 
Such is precisely the consequence that Coleridge builds on the assertion of 
necessary ignorance about Socrates’s daimonion. The tentativeness of Ficino’s 
vocabulary (‘perhaps…so to speak’) prefigures the tangled syntax of Priestley 
and the more elegant but still less than decisive assertion of Coleridge 
regarding the daimonion’s intimations of immortality. 
 Coleridge thus sides broadly with Ficino on this question, but more 
important to the immediate context is that he opposes an anti-Ficinian 
perspective. Ficino’s view that Socrates, with his morally-charged daemonic 
intuitions, had anticipated Christ’s revolutionary moral teaching, met with 
strong opposition in the Enlightenment. The founder of the discipline of the 
history of philosophy, Johann Jakob Brucker, was determined to find a 
naturalistic explanation for the daimonion, and this for a religious motive. If 
the daimonion were real, Brucker feared, then Christ’s claim to uniqueness 
might be endangered, for in this case Christ would have the advantage neither 
of superior reason nor of a unique revelation.20 This threat became reality in 
the interpretation of J.J. Zimmermann, for whom the daimonic interventions 
are miracles just like the Christian miracles, and at least as well attested as those 
of Christ; in both cases God found that reason alone was not sufficient to 
spread enlightenment, and so provided supernatural aid.21 The bedfellow of 
Zimmermann’s interpretation, no less threatening from Brucker’s viewpoint, 
was that of the French philosophes, who portrayed Socrates as a kind of ‘secular 
Christ’.22  Zimmermann’s holy heathen and Diderot’s secular Christ would 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
19  Marsilio Ficino, letter to Paolo Ferobanti (mid-1480s), in Allen, Synoptic Art, Appendix 1 (p. 211; cf. p. 131). For a 
different and fully annotated translation of this letter, see The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, translated from the Latin by 
members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Science, London, 9 vols, vol. 7 (being a 
translation of Liber VIII) (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 2003), 12-14. Ficino applies an elaborate daemonology to 
Socrates’s divine sign, of a kind that would have appealed to the author of the ‘Ancient Mariner’: Ficino describes it 
in apparently paradoxical terms as fiery yet saturnian (Allen, 139, 203). 
20  Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, ‘Sokrates im Dickicht der deutschen Aufklärung’, in Der fragende Socrates, ed. by Karl 
Pestalozzi (Stuttgart and Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1999), 132-151 (138). 
21  See Benno Böhm, Sokrates im achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Studien zum  Werdegange des modernen Persönlichkeitsbewusstseins 
(Neumünster: Karl Wachholtz, 1966), 141-2. 
22  Jeffrey L. High, ‘“Rede über die Frage: Gehört allzuviel Güte, Leutseeligkeit und grosse Freygebigkeit im engsten 
Verstande zur Tugend?” Socrates as Secular Jesus in Schiller’s First Karlsschule Speech’, in Reading Schiller: Ethics, 
Aesthetics, and Religion, ed. Laura Anna Macor, special issue of Philosophical Readings: Online Yearbook of Philosophy 5 
(2013), 7-49 (esp. 7-8), http://issuu.com/philosophicalreadings/docs/pr2013/7. 
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have been equally alarming to Brucker, the pietistic defender of Protestant 
religious feeling, who wanted clearly to separate Christ from Socrates. In his 
history, Brucker thus followed the Unitarian biographer of Socrates, Thomas 
Cooper, in downplaying the daimonion, by interpreting it as simply a prompt 
and refined moral sense. Cooper wrote of the daimonion:  
 
[I]t was nothing more than that inward Feeling inseparable from the 
Hearts of all good and wise Men, which (excited at first by probable 
Conjectures of future Events, collected from a retrospective View of the 
past, and a Consideration of the invariable Connection of human 
Contingencies) works itself by degrees even into our Constitution, and 
gives the Breast an almost prophetic sensation of what ought to be done 
before the slower Faculties of the Mind can prove the moral Rectitude of 
the Conduct.23   
 
In Cooper’s view, subsequently assimilated into Brucker’s authoritative text, 
‘daimonion’ is simply a metaphor for this normal faculty of moral prescience. 
Again, Coleridge is likely to have known Cooper’s work, having read him back 
in the days of Pantisocracy; but it is not as a possible source that Cooper is of 
interest here, but rather as showing why Coleridge (following Tennemann) was 
so concerned to underline that the daimonion could not be equivalent to 
conscience. For Coleridge was by this time broadly opposed to the 
Enlightenment project of rationalising the teachings of Socrates, which the 
Unitarians pursued in parallel to the larger work of demystifying the history of 
Christian doctrine. Another source that Coleridge knew (and dismissed as a 
‘mere bookseller’s Job Abridgement’, CL IV 589) was the abridged translation 
of Brucker’s history of philosophy by William Enfield, a Unitarian minister. 
Enfield evidently found Brucker’s debunking of emphatic claims for the 
significance of Socrates congenial. Indeed, in Enfield’s view, Brucker does not 
provide a sufficiently decisive rationalisation of the daimonion, and Enfield 
recommends the argument of Nare that Socrates’s descriptions of his 
daimonion indicate that he had some traces of superstition:  
 
Our author [Brucker] seems loth to give any decisive opinion in this 
affair […]. A late writer advances a notion on this subject, which appears 
to merit attention. Socrates, he remarks, believed in the gods of his 
country, and was not free from the superstition connected with that 
belief…’24  
 
The respectful and relatively cautious rationalisation provided by Cooper and 
adopted by Brucker thus becomes brasher in Enfield, who points to the 
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23  John Gilbert Cooper, The Life of Socrates, 2nd edition (London: R. Dodsley, 1750), 92. 
24  William Enfield, The History of Philosophy, from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Present Century, drawn up from 
Brucker’s Historia Critical Philosophiae, 2 vols (Dublin, 1792), I, 172-3 (note, citing Nare’s ‘Essay on the Daemon of 
Socrates’, 1782). 
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opinion that Socrates was superstitious and thus not assimilable to true 
religion.  
 The Unitarian preference for a rational type of explanation in the spirit of 
the Enlightenment is even more marked in Joshua Toulmin’s comparison of 
Socrates with Christ in his Dissertation on the Internal Evidences and Excellence of 
Christianity. In Toulmin’s point-by-point presentation – directed against 
Ficino’s syncretistic, Christian Platonist comparison – Christ emerges superior 
to Socrates in every respect. It is in the interest of Toulmin’s argument to press 
further the insinuation of Socrates’s superstition, and dismiss the daimonion as 
a completely natural phenomenon: it was, he writes, as natural as sneezing.25 In 
this way, Toulmin – perhaps unconscious of the irony involved – sides with a 
rather limited character in Plutarch’s dialogue De Genio Socratis: it is Plutarch’s 
Galaxidorus who, wishing to defend Socrates from the charge of irrational 
superstition, proposes as most likely that ‘a sneeze or chance remark’ would be 
the decisive influence on the philosopher’s reflections.26 It is unlikely that 
Coleridge had this complex matrix of opinions at the forefront of his mind, 
but he knew what a vexed issue the daimonion was for both Unitarian thinkers 
and for the syncretistic Christian Platonism that they opposed. 
 As I have already mentioned, by 1819 when he is delivering his 
philosophical lectures, Coleridge has moved decisively away from the 
Unitarianism he espoused in the 1790s. He retains enough of the scholarly 
impetus he acquired in that decade to be wary of Ficinian Neoplatonism and 
desirous of clearing away aside swathes of historical commentary to grasp the 
original phenomenon, whether Christ or Socrates.27 But given his new view of 
Reason as a higher faculty than the mere Understanding, it is not surprising to 
find Coleridge apparently returning to a pre-Enlightenment view of Socrates’s 
daimonion. Hence he emphasises that Socrates’s daimonion cannot be 
explained away in ordinary terms, being neither conscience nor an unusually 
developed faculty of understanding: and this preservation of a sense of mystery 
helps Coleridge to reinforce the notion that divine providence was providing a 
certain level of light already in the pre-Christian era. 
 And yet, we circle back to the remarkable fact that of all the opinions on the 
daimonion of Socrates that had been recently advanced, the one to which 
Coleridge appears closest is that of Joseph Priestley. ‘Thus do such 
supernatural suggestions as Socrates asserts that he had afford some obscure 
and indistinct evidence of a moral government of the world, and consequently 
of a future state of righteous retribution’, Priestley had written.28 With a certain 
degree of caution, in other words, Priestley enlists the daimonion of Socrates 
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25  Joshua Toulmin, Dissertation on the Internal Evidences and Excellence of Christianity (1785), 190. 
26  Plutarch, ‘On the Sign of Socrates’, trans. Phillip H. De Lacy and Benedict Einarson, vol. VII of Plutarch’s Moralia 
(London: Loeb Classics, 1959), 409. As Paul Friedländer explains, in a seminal twentieth-century discussion of 
Socrates’s daimonion, ‘In Plutarch’s dialogue… a childishly crude confusion of the Socratic daimonion with such 
phenomena as sneezing or soothsaying “voices”, used for the purposes of popular divination, is replaced by a more 
profound view probably originating in Poseidonios: as human speech affects the ear, so the Logoi (to retain this 
equivocal term) of the demons direcly affect the human soul.’ Plato: An Introduction (New York: Bollingen, 1958), 37. 
27  I have explored this aspect of Coleridge’s thought further in Platonic Coleridge, 23. 
28 Joseph Priestley, Socrates and Jesus Compared (London: J. Johnson, 1803), 31. 
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for the central tenet of his theology, which he often summed up in that phrase 
‘moral government of the world’. Priestley had long ago argued this conviction 
that the world is governed by a benevolent deity in, for instance, his Letters to a 
Philosophical Unbeliever.29 Coleridge continues to echo this very debate in The 
Friend, where he discusses complaints of ‘the incomprehensibility of the moral 
government of the world, and the seeming injustice and cruelty of the 
dispensations of Providence’ (Friend I 342). One of Coleridge’s aims in The 
Friend, and subsequently in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, is to justify the 
ways of God to men: to assert providence in the face of sceptical doubts. This 
had been none other than Priestley’s own project; and Coleridge’s polemic 
against Priestleyan Unitarianism, which he eventually considered to be a kind 
of trojan horse for ‘infidelity’, should not blind us to the extent to which he 
was still pursuing Priestley’s lines of thought in 1819. The ‘genial coincidence’ 
of the two writers’ treatment of the daimonion of Socrates is a case in point. 
Both Priestley and Coleridge find it difficult to assert very positively that 
Socrates received ‘inspiration’, yet both welcome this suggestion as sustaining 
the view that divine justice extends to all times and all places. In this way, 
Ficino’s view of the daimonion somewhat paradoxically re-emerges, in 
Priestley (who vigorously debunked Neoplatonic metaphysics) and then in 
Coleridge (whose attitude to it was ambivalent). This example indicates that 
Priestley’s philosophical system was more flexible and capacious than 
Coleridge – who had learned much from it before rejecting it – was prepared 
publically to admit. It also reflects the dissenting ideal of the candid exercise of 
private judgment: for Priestley was not influenced by the dismissive account of 
the daimonion in Toulmin, because, as he relates in his dedication to Toulmin, 
he stubbornly made it a matter of principle not to read the latter’s work until 
he had completed his own comparison of Socrates and Christ.  
 As I have suggested above, it would be unhelpful to turn to traditional 
categories to define the relation of Priestley’s text to Coleridge’s comments on 
the daimonion in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. It is evidently not a 
‘source’, nor is it either ‘plagiarised’ or handled ‘originally’ by Coleridge. It is, 
rather, the most telling element of an extensive network of views on this 
controversial topic. By treating the daimonion as evidence of a higher kind of 
rationality in Socrates (rather than of irrational superstition), Coleridge casts 
aside recent naturalistic explanations, and instead takes up the Ficinian notion 
that Providence governs the whole history of philosophy, which he makes 
central to his Lectures. In so doing, however, he tacitly drops Ficino’s 
Neoplatonic daemonology – and thus reveals his continued affinity with 
Joseph Priestley, the rational dissenter. 
 After he delivered the Lectures, Coleridge continued to muse privately on 
this problem.  In marginalia to Tennemann’s history of philosophy, he objects 
to the latter’s version of a rationalistic explanation. Tennemann proposes in a 
confident tone that the daimonion was a kind of unconsciously acquired skill 
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29 Letter seven of Priestley’s Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever, second edition (Birmingham, 1787), is entitled ‘Evidence 
of the moral Government of the World’. 
Coleridge’s View of the Daimonion of Socrates― 26 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
derived from childhood experiences; but Coleridge cogently replies that this 
way of accounting for the phenomenon attributes such energy to the 
‘unconscious’ as to be tantamount to admitting exactly what Socrates says 
about the daimonion:   
 
As little am I satisfied with Tennemann’s explanation of the Daemon or 
Daimonion of Socrates […]. Grant, that it was no more than a peculiarly 
energetic Habit or Faculty of Presentiment developed at an unusually 
early period of Life—that which the Magnetists and Tennemann call 
Ahnungsvermögen: this does but shift the problem. Meanwhile the 
exceedingly contingent and accidental nature of the occasions, on which 
it was called forth, renders the solution of this Faculty from indistinct 
recollection of past minute, & perhaps at the time unconscious, 
experiences <very far from> satisfactory—At all events, <the 
explanation can be regarded as> sufficient, only where such an extent 
and importance are given to the term unconscious, in <its> combination 
with experiences, notices, and the like, as would amount to the 
assumption of an interior Man exercising higher powers than the Self-
conscious Man or what each man calls I, is endued with. But if so, what 
is this less than a Daimonion (Divinum quid) or theos oikeios, domestic 
God, or Divine Familiar—in short, what Socrates believed it to be? 
    S.T. Coleridge.―1822. (CM V 723, Greek transliterated) 
 
And so Coleridge remained in mysteries, doubts, and uncertainties respecting 
the daimonion of Socrates, which he in 1821 briefly linked to his conception of 
the ‘symbol’ in the context of Plutarch’s De Genio Socratis (CN IV 4832 f61r), 
but otherwise refrained from interrogating further.  
 Coleridge’s studied uncertainty contrasts rather comically with the serene 
confidence of religious radical of a different temperament, William Blake, in 
linking Socrates with Christ and both with himself. In conversation with Henry 
Crabb Robinson in 1825, Blake used the expression ‘The Spirits told me’, 
which led Robinson to ask: ‘Socrates used pretty much the same language – He 
spoke of his genius Now what affinity or resemblance do you suppose there 
was between the genius which inspired Socrates and your Spirits?’ According 
to Robinson, Blake now 
 
…smiled, and for once it seemed to me as if he had a feeling of vanity 
gratified – Pretty much The same as in our countenances He paused and 
then said “I was Socrates[”] – and then as if he had gone too far in that – 
[“]Or a sort of brother I must have had conversations with him – So I 
had with Jesus Christ I have an obscure recollection of having been with 
both of them[”].30 
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30  Henry Crabb Robinson, ‘William Blake’ (written 1852, recording events in the year 1825), in Reminiscences, MS, Dr 
Williams’s Library, 4 vols, appendix to vol. 2. I thank the Director (David Wykes) and Trustees of Dr Williams’s 
Library for permission to quote from manuscript material in the Henry Crabb Robinson collection. 
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Such was Blake’s playfully literalistic view of Socrates and of his doctrine of 
recollection, or anamnesis.  
 More philosophical in his approach than Blake, Coleridge similarly wishes 
to link Socrates’s ‘inspirations’ in some indefinite way with Christian revelation, 
and to hint in this context at his own standing as a thinker of genius; but his 
care to emphasise the inexplicability of the daimonion situates him (as we have 
seen) in proximity to Priestley, who in this respect swum against the Unitarian 
mainstream. As Blake’s claiming of it might suggest, the Socratic daimonion 
was far from respectable in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. A 
Quarterly reviewer writing in the same year as Coleridge’s Lectures, for instance, 
frowned at Socrates’s ‘belief in a supernatural agency, to an extent not precisely 
recognized by the religion of his country’, and at his acting ‘under the 
immediate direction of a supernatural being’.31 But Coleridge the London 
lecturer, though hesitant, perhaps due to this problem of respectability, 
continues to pursue his thoughts in an independent direction. What was at 
stake was Coleridge’s attempt, which drives the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, to maintain the uniqueness of Christian morality and revelation 
while nevertheless gathering up the best of ancient philosophy. For, as he 
argued in Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, ‘The history of all historical nations 
must in some sense be its [Christianity’s] history – in other words, all history 
must be providential, and this a providence, a preparation, and a looking 
forward to Christ’ (SWF II 1119). 
 Coleridge’s interest in the daimonion, although by no means all-
encompassing, is one of the key elements through which he maintains this 
providential view of philosophical history. At the same time, it reflects 
Coleridge’s interest in the puzzle of the semi-daemonic inward voice of an 
agency that appears to be other than conscience. In Hegel’s comparable terms, 
‘The daimonion… is something inward, but such that it is represented as a 
personal genius, as differentiated from the human will; not as his cleverness or 
wilfulness.’32 This last comparison is, like most of the texts I have surveyed in 
this essay, by no means a ‘source’ for Coleridge (indeed, Hegel’s history of 
philosophy was composed after Coleridge’s), but it helps to demonstrate the 
direction which European thought was taking on this topic. It was only after 
Coleridge’s death that Søren Kierkegaard’s thesis On the Concept of Irony with 
Constant Reference to Socrates (1841) would provide a completely new departure.   
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31  [Thomas Mitchell], review of Lectures on the History of Literature, Ancient and Modern from the German of Frederick Schlegel 
[trans. J.G. Lockhart], Quarterly Review, 21 (1819), 271-320 (315, 296). 
32  G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, in Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe in zwanzig Bänden, ed. H. 
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